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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
-ooOoo-
EDWIN GOSSNER, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC., a 
corporation, E. ODELL SUMMERS, 
ORVAL E. PETERSEN, Defendants 
and Respondents, and BERKELEY 
BANK FOR COOPERATIVES, a corp-
oration, 
Defendant 
Appellant. 
-ooOoo-
Case No. 15679 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
-ooOoo-
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF BOX ELDER COUNTY 
THE HONORABLE VENOY CHRISTOFFERSEN, DISTRICT JUDGE 
DALE M. DORIUS 
29 South Main Street 
P. 0. Box U 
-ooOoo-
Brigham City, UT 84302 
Attorney for Defendants-
Respondents, E. ODELL 
SUMMERS & ORVAL E. 
PETERSEN. 
W. CLARK BURT 
CALLISTER, GREEN, & NEBEKER 
Suite BOO Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant, BERKELEY BANK 
FOR COOPERATIVES. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an interpleader action by Plaintiff, WHEREIN 
Plaintiff tendered into court the amount of $31,635.29, 
and wherein the Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers 
and Orval E. Petersen, and the Defendant-Appellant, 
Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives claimed an interest in the 
money tendered. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Berkeley Bank's Motions for a Directed Verdict and 
for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict were denied, and 
the jury entered a verdict in favor of the Defendants-
Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E. Petersen, and 
the court entered a Judgment and Findings of Fact and Con-
clusions of Law, in accordance therewith. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval E. 
Petersen, seek an order sustaining the trial court order 
in their favor, entitling them to a portion of the monies 
tendered into court by the Plaintiff amounting to $12,127.67 
for E. Odell summers and $12,467.13 for Orval E. Petersen. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants-Respondents, E. Odell Summers and Orval 
E. Petersen, are dairy farmers. Sometime prior to 1975 
both men became members of the dairy cooperative, Defendant 
Dairymen Associates, Inc. (hereinafter Dairymen), executing 
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uniform marketing agreements with the cooperative. Basic-
ally, the agreement provided that Dairymen would market all 
milk produced by the dairy farmers, and in turn would reim-
burse the farmers in payment for the amount contributed.by 
the farmers for the cooperative. 
Dairymen contracted separately with an independent milk 
hauler to pick up the milk from Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen 
and later deliver it to Dairymen's various customers. (T. 
27). 
In January, 1975, Dairymen's checks to Mr. Summers and 
Mr. Petersen failed to clear the bank due to insufficient 
funds in its account. (T. 72,159). Both Mr. Summers and 
Mr. Petersen notified Dairymen that the bank had refused 
payment of its checks. (T. 72,159). After telephone dis-
cussions with Dairymen concerning the bad checks, and in 
view of Dairymen's shaky financial picture, both Mr. Summers 
and Mr. Petersen told Dairymen that they considered the con-
tract to have been breached and both desired to terminate 
the contract. (T. 72,74,159). 
In March, 1975, Dairymen executed a security agreement 
with Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives, (hereinafter Berkeley 
Bank) wherein Dairymen delivered two promissory notes pay-
able to Berkeley Bank in the amounts of $380,000.00 (Ex. 9) 
and $18 0 , 0 0 0 . 0 0 (Ex . l 0 ) . 
Dairymen requested that each of its members sign an 
-2-
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"Installment Promissory Note" in the amount of $14,000.00. 
(T. 28,29). William Henry Finney, at the time general 
manager of Dairymen, described the notes as basically a 
commitment on the producer's part to continue shipping milk 
to Dairymen. (Ex. 52) Both Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen 
refused to sign the notes and again expressed their feelings 
that Dairymen had breached the agreement and their desire 
to terminate membership in the association. (T. 20,30,52,74). 
On April 3, 1975, Dairymen through its attorney, 
threatened legal action in the event Mr. Summers and Mr. 
Petersen terminated the agreement. (Ex. 4,26). 
On April 9, 1975, Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen, through 
their attorney, wrote a letter stating that because of 
Dairymen's shaky financial situation, mismanagement of 
affairs, the incurring of heavy debt, and issuance of the 
checks with insufficient finds, both wished to terminate 
their association with Dairymen. (Ex. 22). 
Dairymen invited Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen to attend 
an association meeting on April 26, 1975 to discuss their 
grievances with the cooperative. (Ex. 13). Dairymen rejected 
requests that the agreement be terminated on that occasion. 
In July, 1975, Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen instructed 
Mr. George Thornley, a milk hauler, to stop delivering 
their milk to Dairymen and begin delivering their milk 
directly to Gessner Cheese Company. Both farmers also 
-3-
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notified both Dairymen and Edwin 0. Gassner of their inten-
tions. (T. 76,164,165). 
From July, 1975, to November, 1975, when Dairymen went 
out of businesss, Mr. Thornley delivered the Respondents' 
milk directly to Gassner. (T. 23) However apparently be-
cause of Gassner's fear that he would incur legal action 
from Dairymen, he continued to send payment to Dairymen in 
July and August. No payments were sent in at least October 
and November of 1975. However, Dairymen continued to claim 
the milk delivered to Gassner from Mr. Summers and Mr. 
Petersen on its accounts receivables. It also continued to 
send checks to the two farmers for the milk. 
It did this even though it knew that Respondents were 
delivering milk directly to Gassner (T. 32) and despite the 
fact that Mr. Thornley was terminated as a Dairymen hauler 
on October 1, 1975. (T. 55). 
Both Respondents continued to accept the checks because 
Gassner had not tendered payment to them to that point. 
However, checks sent in September, October and November of 
1975 failed to clear the bank. 
In November of 1975, Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen filed 
an action against Dairymen and Gassner Cheese Company, 
d th Of $12,127. 67 to Mr. Summers and claiming amounts owe em 
$12,467.13 to Mr. Petersen. (Ex. 14, 28). Dairymen failed 
to answer the complaint and a Default Judgment was entered 
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against it. (Ex. 15,29). Gossner Cheese Company and Edwin 
o. Gossner were dismissed from the suit with prejudice by 
Stipulation and Order (EX. 17,20,31) pursuant to an agree-
ment that Gassner tender the money into court by filing an 
interpleader action. (T. 80,99,194). The dismissal was 
filed only after the Stipulation and Order were agreed to. 
(T. 109). 
-5-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT WAS CORRECT IN DENYING 
APPELLANT'S MOTIONS FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT 
AND FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE FOR A NEW 
TRIAL. 
At the close of the evidence Appellant's counsel moved 
the Court for a directed verdict in its favor on the basis 
that the Respondents failed to meet their respective burdens 
of proof and upon the fact that issues raised at this trial 
were res judicata. The Court denied the motion. (T. 210). 
The Court thereafter entered Findings of Fact and Conclu-
sions of Law and Judgment on November 28, 1977. The Appel-
lant filed its Motions for Judgment Notwithstanding the 
Verdict and for a New Trial on December 7, 1977. (R. 239). 
The Court denied these motions and entered a Memorandum 
Decision on January 17, 1978, (R. 267) and an Order Denying 
Appellants' Motions on January 27, 1978. (R. 268). The 
trial court was correct in denying these motions for the 
following reasons: 
POINT IA 
THE MONEY TENDERED INTO COURT BY THE 
PLAINTIFF WAS OWED TO MR. SUMMERS AND 
MR. PETERSEN FOR MILK DELIVERED DIRECTLY 
TO PLAINTIFF BY VIRTUE OF THE TERMINA-
TION OF THE UNIFORM MARKETING AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN RESPONDENTS AND DEFENDANT 
DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC .. 
Neither Mr. Summers or Mr. Petersen dispute that 
Berkeley Bank has a security interest in the accounts 
-6-
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receivables of Dairymen. However, the money owed for milk 
delivered to Gossner during the months in question is not 
rightfully an account receivable on Dairymen's books. That 
milk was sent directly from Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen 
to Gossner by an independent hauler, Mr. Thornley, whose 
employment with Diarymen had been terminated on October 1, 1975. 
(T. 55). The milk was delivered with notice to all parties 
that neither Mr. Summers or Mr. Petersen were operating un-
der the terminated agreement with Dairymen. (T. 76,164,165). 
That both farmers continued to receive and accept 
checks from Dairymen after the contract was terminated does 
not necessarily waive the termination. 
In Pedrini v. Mid-City Trailer Depot, Inc. 459 P2d 
76 (Wash. 1969), the court stated: 
"Diligence in recission is a relative 
question, and whether or not there has 
been an unreasonable delay in a given 
case depends upon the particular cir-
cumstances of the case." 459 P2d at 78. 
Likewise, in Eggen v. M & K Trailers and Mobile Home Brokers, 
Inc., 482 P2d 435 (Colo. 1971), the court, in holding that 
four to five months was not an unreasonable delay for a 
buyer to effect a recission of a sales contract, explained: 
" ... a delay on the part of the buy~r 
will be excused in excercising his r7ght 
to rescind, if it is due to the prom1ses 
of the seller that the defect will be 
remedied, or to his requests that further 
trial be made, or to other acts ?r declar-
ations of the seller tending to 1nduce 
delay." 482 P2d at 438. 
-7-
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In Eggen, the seller repeatedly told the buyers that 
the defects discovered by the buyers on a newly purchased 
mobile home would be fixed. Such assurances stalled the 
buyers from fully rescinding the agreement. Finally, when 
after more than four months of assurances without action, the 
buyers terminated the contract. 
In the case before this court, Dairymen continually 
resisted efforts by the Respondents to terminate the agree-
ment after its original breach by threatening law suits. 
Dairymen also wrongfully continued to bill Gessner for 
milk delivered by Mr. Thornley, even after the latter's 
termination of employment as a hauler for Dairymen on 
October 1, 1975. 
These actions deterred Gessner from paying Mr. Summers 
and Mr. Petersen for the milk he received from them. It 
certainly prevented Respondents from rejecting checks sent 
by Dairymen representing payment for the milk for fear that 
if they failed to accept the checks, they might not receive 
any payment for the milk at all. 
It is crystal clear that from the first time that 
Dairymen's check was returned for lack of sufficient funds 
that Respondents considered that action a breach of the 
agreement and they in turn expressed an intention to 
terminate. Evidences of this intention were manifested 
in continued oral expressions, refusal to sign the "Install-
ment Promissory Notes," in a written letter through their 
-8-
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attorney dated April 9, 1975, (Ex. 22), and finally their 
action to quit delivering milk to Dairymen in July of 1975. 
(T. 76). 
The letter of April 9th, expressed concern over Dairy-
men's mismanagement of monies, its newly acquired debt and 
the desire to terminate the membership of both Mr. Summers 
and Mr. Petersen based on these observations and Dairymen's 
earlier breach. 
Yet, Dairymen at no time offered any assurances that 
it was indeed financially sound enough to continue meeting 
its obligations under the contract and in fact by September 
of 1975 it could not longer meet its obligations and by the 
beginning of 1976 had been declared bankrupt. 
If there was any delay on the part of Respondents to 
make an effective termination of the contract, there is 
overwhelming evidence that the delay was caused by Dairymen's 
threat of legal action and wrongful billing. 
It is most clear that Respondents at all times intended 
for the contract to be terminated. It was only a matter of 
how to effect such a termination without becoming financially 
disabled. 
The agreement having been terminated, Dairymen had no 
legal right to place the amount of milk delivered from the 
Respondents to Gassner as owing to it on its accounts 
receivable list. Yet they did so, billing Gassner accordingly. 
-9-
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At the same time, they attempted to pay Respondents for the 
milk that the Respondents themselves had delivered to 
Gossner. The checks sent for this purpose failed to clear 
the bank during the months of September, October and 
November of 1975. 
This money should not have been paid by Dairymen. It 
was rightfully owed by Gossner to be paid directly to 
Respondents. 
POINT IB 
THE DEFAULT JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST 
DAIRYMEN ASSOCIATES, INC., IN WEBER 
COUNTY DOES NOT HAVE RES JUDICATA OR 
COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL EFFECT ON THE 
ISSUES AND PARTIES IN THIS ACTION. 
As stated in Appellants brief, the elements of res 
judicata as enunciated by the Utah Supreme Court in East 
Millcreek Water Co. v. Salt Lake City, 159 P2d 863 (Utah, 
1949), are as follows: 
(1) it must be between the same parties or privies; 
(2) it applies only where the claim, demand, or 
cause of action is the same in both cases; and 
(3) the matter goes to final judgment, in other 
words, a judgment on the merits. 
See also Wheadon v. Pearson, 376 P2d 946 (Utah 1962). 
The general rule, as set forth in Appellant's brief, is 
that a Default Judgment is a final judgment on the merits 
for the purposes of both res judicata and collateral estop-
pel. Blache v. Blache, 160 P2d 136 (Calif. 1945); Tee~ 
Air Products, Inc. vs. Sheridan-Gray, Inc., 445 P2d 426 
-10-
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(Ariz. 1968); Tarnoff v. Jones, 497 P2d 60 (Ariz. 1972); 
Kernan v. Kernan, 369 P2d 451 (Nev. 1962). 
However, there is an exception to the general rule that 
a default judgment is a final judgment for res judicata and 
collateral estoppel purposes. That exception comes into 
play when there is more than one Defendant or one Plaintiff 
in the action and a default judgment is entered against one 
of the parties. 
In Tarnoff v. Jones, supra, a default judgment was 
entered against one of the Defendants, but no default was 
obtained against the other Defendant. In holding that res 
judicata was not proper in this instance, the court stated: 
"Since this judgment did not dispose of 
the claim against Defendant Gaiber • • 
. the judgment was not final and hence not 
appealable. The doctrine of res 
judicata does not apply to an inter-
locutory judgment." 497 P2d at 62. 
In this case, the default judgment was entered against 
Dairymen in Weber County when Dairymen failed to answer. But 
that judgment did not have immediate effect upon Respond-
ents' claim against Gassner. Respondents were still free to 
pursue their claim in that forum against Gossner without 
incurring the burden of res judicata or collateral estoppel. 
Indeed Respondents would have been permitted in the normal 
course of bringing the action to amend their pleadings or 
parties. They did not choose to do so for good reason. 
-11-
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The record clearly shows and the testimony of the 
Respondents is to the effect that a stipulation and order 
were entered into by all parties to dismiss with prejudice 
the action against Gassner as to all liability to the money 
involved in his case because Gassner tendered the money 
into this Court. (Ex. 17, 20) (T. 80, 99, 194). 
The effect of this action was beneficial to all parties 
involved. Gassner saved legal fees; Berkeley Bank was given 
an opportunity to prove that the money was due as an account 
receivable on Dairymen's books; and if Respondents prevailed 
against Gassner they would receive the money immediately 
without resort to collection procedures to obtain the proceeds, 
! 
from the judgment. 
Based on Tarnoff v. Jones, supra, the default judgment 
against DAirymen had no res judicata or collateral estoppel 
effect on Respondents action against Gassner in the Weber 
County suit. As such, authority cited by Appellant on 
the doctrines of res judicata, collateral estoppel and 
discharges of judgments in bankruptcy are inapplicable to 
the peculiar circumstances of this case. 
This forum simply represents a more convenient way to 
determine whether or not the money Gossner owes for milk 
delivered to his premises should be paid directly to the 
Respondents. All parties agreed to this. (Ex 0 17, 2 0) o 
-12-
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To permit Appellant Berkeley Bank to invoke the doc-
trines of res judicata and collateral estoppel after having 
entered into such a stipulation would clearly defraud the 
concepts of fairness and equity. Because of the peculiar 
facts present in this case, Appellant should be barred from 
raising these defenses. 
POINT IC 
THE RESPONDENTS MET THEIR BURDEN OF 
PROOF THAT THEY WERE ENTITLED TO A 
PORTION OF THE MONEY TENDERED INTO 
COURT BY GOSSNER. 
Much testimony was presented during the course of the 
trial upon which reasonable minds could draw to determine 
that the Respondents, Mr. Summers and Mr. Petersen, were 
entitled to a portion of the money tendered into court by 
Gossner. 
Both Respondents testified that they instructed Mr. 
Thornley and notified Mr. Gossner that milk would be 
delivered directly to Gossner after July of 1975. (T. 18, 
78, 163, 164, 165). Both Respondents testified that they 
demanded payment from Gossner for the milk they had de-
livered to him. (T. 78,165). Mr. Summers testified that 
he figured out the amount due him by Gossner by examining 
Dairymen's checks during the months of September, October 
and November of 1975, which were an attempt by Dairymen 
to pay Mr. Summers for the milk he had delivered to 
Gossner. (T. 79). These attempted payments are especially 
-13-
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interesting in light of the fact that Mr. Summers had 
refused and was not delivering milk to or through Dairymen 
during these three (3) months and had notified it of that 
fact. (T. 76). 
Mr. Petersen had determined the amount Gossner owed him 
for delivered milk by adding up the pounds of milk which he 
had record of delivering to Gossner and multiplying the 
poundage by the price of the milk. (T. 167). This amount he 
testified corresponded with the amount which Dairymen 
attempted to pay him. (T. 168). 
Gessner's son testified that the amount tendered into 
court represents the amount of the invoice sent to Gossner 
by Dairymen. This invoice was consistent with the milk 
tickets in Gessner's possession. (T. 135). There was 
testimony presented that milk delivered by Thornley for 
Respondents was written up on Dairymen tickets even after 
instructions had been given to the contrary. Gessner's son 
had no record of exactly who brought what milk in. (T. 
136}. 
Still, the evidence showed that Gossner owed the 
Respondents money. Dairymen did attempt to pay the Respond-
ents for the same amounts they alleged were owed to them by 
Gossner. Edwin 0. Gossner himself never denied owing money 
to Respondents. He was never called as a witness in this 
action to rebut any of the testimony presented. 
-14-
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Based on the foregoing facts and testimony, it is 
clear that reasonable minds could conclude that tbe 
Respondents were entitled to a portion of the money 
tendered by Gossner into court. This is substantiated 
by the verdict returned on the trial level by the jury in 
this case. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED APPEL-
LANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL. 
1. The Trial Court did not err in allowing testimony 
as to issues which were res judicata, and allowing that 
the pleadings be conformed to the evidence which was 
presented at the trial. 
Based on the arguments set forth in Point IB of 
Respondents' brief, the Trial Court correctly denied Appel-
lant's motion to invoke res judicata and collateral estoppel. 
part: 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule lS(b), reads in 
. . . If evidence is objected to at 
trial on the ground that it is not 
within the issues made by the plead-
ings, the court may allow the plead-
ings to be amended when the p:esen~a­
tion of the merits of the act1on w1ll 
be subserved thereby and the objecting 
party fails to satisfy t~e court that 
the admission of such ev1dence would. 
prejudice him in mainta~ning his act1on 
or defense upon the mer1ts. '' 
In this case, the court acknowledged that the original 
-15-
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pleadings were different than the basis upon which recovery 
by the Respondents was sought. However, in reviewing the 
record of the trial the court concluded: 
"The court further finds that the 
pleadings may be conformed to what 
the evidence presented is. Since the 
theory is not a surprise one but was 
raised, certain pleadings prior to 
this time, and that their theory, al-
though not an amended pleading, was 
advanced in their memorandum, briefs 
and responses to motion for summary 
judgment back in December of 1976. 
So that the theory of the case and 
the theory on which we've proceeded 
certainly doesn't come as a surprise, 
it being now nearly a year later." 
(T. 155). 
Based on Rule 15(b), the courts ruling on allowing 
the pleadings to be conformed to the evidence is entirely 
proper. Appellant simply failed to convince the court 
that it would be prejudiced by the action or that it was a 
surprise. 
2. Respondents concede that the Court erred in 
allowing hearsay evidence as to what Edwin 0. Gessner 
allegedly said to the Respondents. The evidence was 
permitted on the assumption that Gassner would be called 
later as a witness and would have an opportunity to rebut 
the testimony. He was not called. 
But the evidence admitted, did not stand as a naked 
prosecutor of Respondents' claim. As stated throughout 
Respondents' brief, there was substantial evidence to 
support the verdict rendered in this case by the jury. 
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There is no evidence whatsoever that the jury relied heavily 
on this evidence to reach its verdict. In view of tbaae 
facts, this was harmless error. , . 
3. The trial court did not err in qivinq Instructian 
Number 7. The question of whether or not the Respondeat&, 
prior to September 1, 1975, had terminated any associatioa 
with Dairymen is totally material to the issues. There was 
evidence that the contract had been terminated by the 
Respondents. The fact that the Respondents had t~rminated 
their agreement with Dairymen was material to the issue of 
whether or not they were entitled to receive money directly 
from Mr. Gassner for milk delivered during the months of 
September, October, and November 1975. 
The court also did not err in failing to give Appellant's 
proposed instructions concerning the definition of a security 
agreement. That Instruction Number 7 covers the question 
of the assignment of accounts receivable. 
The Court did give instructions regarding the burden of 
proof of the parties in Instruction Number 5 and Instruction 
Number 6. 
The Court did adequately instruct the jury. 
4. The evidence clearly was sufficient to justify the 
verdict rendered in this case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Respondents, having met their burden of proving that 
they were entitled to a portion of the money tendered into 
this court by Edwin 0. Gassner, respectfully request this 
court to sustain the judgment rendered in Box Elder County 
and award $12,127.67 to E. Odell Summers and $12,467.13 to 
Orval E. Petersen. 
Attorney for Defendants-Respondents, 
E. ODELL SUMMERS & ORVAL E. 
PETERSEN 
P. 0. Box u 
29 South Main Street 
Brigham City, UT 84302 
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has been mailed to: 
W. CLARK BURT 
Suite 800 Kennecott Building 
Salt Lake City, UT 84133 
by depositing said copy in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid 
thccreor,, th1s ~day 
of Ju~l9(l·~~~-----------------­DAL~ 
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